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Abstract 
Organizations use security education, training, and awareness (SETA) programs to counter internal 
security threats and promote compliance with information security policies. Yet, employees often 
use neutralization techniques to rationalize noncompliant behavior. We investigated three theory-
based communication approaches that can be incorporated into SETA programs to help increase 
compliance behavior: (1) informational communication designed to explain why policies are 
important; (2) normative communication designed to explain that other employees would not 
violate policies; and (3) antineutralization communication designed to inhibit rationalization. We 
conducted a repeated measures factorial design survey using a survey panel of full-time working 
adults provided by Qualtrics. Participants received a SETA communication with a combination of 
one to three persuasion statements (informational influence, normative influence statement, and/or 
an antineutralization), followed by a scenario description that asked for their intentions to comply 
with the security policy. We found that both informational (weakly) and antineutralization 
communication (strongly) decreased violation intentions, but that normative communication had 
no effect. In scenarios where neutralizations were explicitly suggested to participants, 
antineutralization communication was the only approach that worked. Our findings suggest that we 
need more research on SETA techniques that include antineutralization communication to 
understand how it influences behavior beyond informational and normative communication. 
Keywords: Information Security, Neutralization, Training, Compliance, Normative Influence, 
Informational Influence, Factorial Survey 
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1 Introduction 
As knowledge sharing and online transactions among 
individuals and organizations increase, information 
security increasingly becomes a strategic issue. 
Although organizations must protect against 
vulnerabilities from outside attacks (Ransbotham & 
Mitra, 2009) and comply with external security and 
privacy rules (Wall, Lowry, & Barlow, 2016), many 
security vulnerabilities arise from the actions of 
employees. Through the use of organizational 
sanctions and security education, training, and 
awareness (SETA) programs, security professionals 
actively battle security incidents (Jenkins & 
Durcikova, 2013) by encouraging employees to 
perform security-related behaviors, such as updating 
software, avoiding questionable emails, and using 
strong passwords (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; 
Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010; Johnston & 
Warkentin, 2010; Johnston, Warkentin, & Siponen, 





2015; Karjalainen & Siponen, 2009; Liang & Xue, 
2009; Liang & Xue, 2010) .   
Modern organizations develop or purchase SETA 
programs designed to reinforce acceptable use 
guidelines and emphasize the potential consequences 
of information security policy violations (D’Arcy, 
Hovav, & Galletta, 2009). However, traditional SETA 
approaches are often ineffective in preventing 
violations (Siponen & Vance, 2010), so it is 
imperative that we explore other approaches to 
designing SETA programs and the way they 
communicate policies to better persuade employees to 
comply (Johnston, Warkentin, McBride, & Carter, 
2016; Johnston et al., 2015). Many researchers 
conclude that managers should effectively 
communicate security-related concepts to their 
employees (Boss, Galletta, Lowry, Moody, & 
Polak, 2015; Siponen & Vance, 2010; Willison, 
Warkentin, & Johnston, 2018), yet little research 
empirically examines how such communication can 
affect later security behavior. Moreover, despite 
the extensive body of research on SETA, little 
research has examined the use of periodic short 
communication from management about the 
importance of complying with information security 
policies and actually applying what is taught in the 
formal SETA process.  
Much like the successes from using so-called 
“nudges” by behavioral economists such as Tversky 
and Kahneman (1981) and Thaler and Sunstein 
(2008) for promoting tax compliance and healthy 
lifestyle decisions, such short periodic 
communications may serve as reminders regarding 
expected behaviors and may be critical to ensure 
greater security policy compliance. Therefore, in this 
paper, we focus on short SETA communications 
designed to augment SETA education and training 
programs. We do not address the content or 
effectiveness of these detailed programs. For an 
overview of SETA education and training 
approaches, see Puhakainen and Siponen (2010). 
Because annual SETA training effectiveness decays 
over time, some employers and software vendors 
have begun to implement real-world short 
communications. Providence Health and Services, a 
hospital chain on the U.S. west coast, has replaced 
office notes with ones that say “protect confidential 
information” and other reminders. The SANS 
Institute distributes post-it notes that include the 
reminder “do not write your password here.” 
Commercial web browsers now utilize security 
warnings displayed to users who may surf to the 
wrong site (Anderson, Vance, Kirwan, Eargle, & 
Jenkins, 2016; Vance, Anderson, Kirwan, & Eargle, 
2014). Many sites now provide instant feedback on 
the strength of newly formed passwords, which has 
been shown to have a positive impact on user security 
behavioral outcomes (Ciampa, 2013; Ur et al., 2012). 
Finally, studies have shown the value of general 
security pop-ups and warnings when users perform 
various actions (Akhawe & Felt, 2013).  
Despite the widespread use of SETA programs that 
are designed to increase awareness of security 
policies and often emphasize the sanctions for 
violations, employees are often noncompliant (EY, 
2017). Although some security incidents arise from 
deliberate employee actions, many vulnerabilities 
originate from nonmalicious security policy 
violations, such as sharing passwords. These 
nonmalicious violations may be due to human error, 
negligence, or poor training. The Global State of 
Information Security Survey 2015 indicated that 
employees remain the most cited perpetrators of 
security incidents. This survey of IT executives from 
154 countries suggested that current employees and 
service providers/consultants were responsible for 
over 50% of reported incidents, with current 
employees being the most cited culprit at 35% 
(www.pwc.com/gsiss2015). Ernst and Young’s 
Global Information Security Survey 2017 mirrored 
these findings: 55% of responding firms said careless 
or unaware employees were the greatest vulnerability 
they faced (EY, 2017).  
When faced with a situation to comply or not comply 
with a security policy, employees assess potential 
consequences and often minimize perceptions of 
negative consequences by rationalizing that their 
actions are necessary to accomplish some higher 
objective (Sykes & Matza, 1957). For example, 
employees may believe that a security policy hinders 
their job performance, and because job performance 
is more important than security, it makes sense to 
violate the policy (Post & Kagan, 2007). More than a 
dozen such neutralization techniques have been 
identified (Willison & Warkentin, 2013) and many 
have been shown to have a greater impact on 
violation intentions than organizational sanctions; 
employees violate IT policies even when they 
know there are sanctions (Siponen & Vance, 2010). 
Through the use of short communication 
statements, we investigate three distinct approaches 
designed to increase compliance. The first two are 
drawn from prior research on persuasive 
communication and the third directly attacks 
neutralization.  
Previous research has identified two main types of 
communication that can persuade someone to comply 
with a request for action: informational influence and 
normative influence (Burnstein & Vinokur, 1973). 
Information influence provides information and 
reasoned arguments in favor of compliance (e.g., by 
explaining why compliance is important) while 
normative influence provides information about 
others who are complying (e.g., by showing that 




compliance is the organizational norm). Both 
informational and normative influence have been 
extensively researched in information systems, 
including topics such as system resistance (Kim & 
Kankanhalli, 2009), technology use and usefulness 
(Lewis, Agarwal, & Sambamurthy, 2003; Liang, 
Saraf, Hu, & Xue, 2007), viral marketing (Subramani 
& Rajagopalan, 2003), and computer-mediated 
communication (Sussman & Siegal, 2003). Prior 
information security studies have examined these as 
antecedents of information security behaviors. For 
example, Liang and Xue (2009) proposed that 
normative influence affects an individual’s evaluation 
of IT threats and safeguarding measures as well as the 
motivation to avoid these threats; Bulgurcu et al. 
(2010) successfully demonstrated that both 
informational and normative influence have an impact 
on security awareness, attitudes, and intentions; 
Puhakainen and Siponen (2010) examined 
informational influence in training programs and 
determined it improved attitude towards and 
compliance with security policies, and Barlow et 
al. (2013) established the impact of informational 
influence on intentions to violate security policies. 
However, few studies have proposed and tested 
practical interventions that leverage these to 
influence compliance behavior (Lebek, Uffen, 
Breitner, Neumann, & Hohler, 2013).   
Both information influence and normative influence 
focus on the situation and the desired behavior, not 
neutralization. Thus, a third possible source of 
influence directly targets the neutralizations that 
employees use to talk themselves out of complying, 
not the decision situation. This form of persuasive 
communication attacks neutralization techniques 
directly by communicating that neutralization is 
unacceptable, rather than using information influence 
or normative influence to focus on the situation or the 
policy. Previous studies support the argument for 
proper training against neutralization. For example, 
training that explains reasons for inequity is 
successful in preventing the use of neutralization 
techniques (Greenberg, 1990; Siponen & Vance, 
2010). Siponen and Vance (2010) further suggest that 
organizations should help employees understand the 
consequences of not adhering to IS security policy and 
that rationalizations are unacceptable, but little research 
has examined this idea empirically. Such trainings 
could emphasize that there are inappropriate ways to 
respond to certain situations. Many information 
security policy studies have focused on what managers 
can do to effectively motivate compliance with 
information security policy; this study, however, 
focuses on how to effectively deter the individual from 
engaging in deviant behaviors resulting from 
rationalizations.   
This leads to the following research questions: (1) 
Can persuasive communication statements increase 
compliance with information security policies? (2) 
Which form(s) of persuasive communication have a 
greater impact on compliance with information 
security policies? In this paper, we examine the 
effects of normative, information, and 
antineutralization SETA communication approaches 
in the context of rationalizing policy violations. Our 
results show that only two were effective: information 
influence and antineutralization communication. In 
situations where the probability of neutralization was 
high (i.e., the treatments in which we suggested 
neutralization arguments to the participants), only 
antineutralization communication was effective; 
neutralization overwhelmed information and 
normative influence.   
The remainder of the paper begins by presenting the 
theoretical background that motivates our conceptual 
model and hypotheses. Next, we describe the factorial 
survey design and statistical analysis used to test 
these hypotheses. Finally, we discuss the results, 
implications, and limitations of this study and suggest 
potential future research opportunities. 
2 Theoretical Background 
When employees face a situation requiring them to 
choose to comply with or violate a security policy, 
they consider the information about the situation, the 
norms of others, and the potential reasons to 
rationalize away the need to comply (Barlow, 
Warkentin, Ormond, & Dennis, 2013). Thus, SETA 
programs that include communications using 
information influence, normative influence, and 
antineutralization approaches may increase security 
policy compliance. Two of these techniques are based 
on fundamental social influence theories: 
informational influence and normative influence 
(Burnstein & Vinokur, 1973), both of which have 
been shown as important internal motivators of 
security behavior (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Liang & 
Xue, 2009; Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010). 
Informational influence theory argues that individual 
behavior is influenced by relevant information, such 
as the outcomes of the behavior, separate from any 
sanctions (Aronson, Wilson, & Akert, 2005; 
Burnstein & Vinokur, 1973; Shaw, 1981). For 
example, information influence could argue that 
sharing passwords increases the risk that someone 
could steal unauthorized information. Normative 
influence theory argues that individuals conform to 
norms of others to preserve a favorable self-
presentation (Aronson et al., 2005; Burnkrant & 
Cousineau, 1975; Kaplan & Miller, 1987). For 
example, normative influence could argue that 99% 
of employees say they never will share a password. 
The third technique, which we call antineutralization 





communication, directly addresses the temptation to 
neutralize, rather than the situation itself. For 
example, antineutralization statements could say that 
although some people believe that sharing passwords 
causes no harm, this is false; there are no 
circumstances where sharing passwords is justified.  
Our study extends prior research by adapting these 
three approaches (informational influence, normative 
influence, and neutralization) into short SETA 
communication statements designed to reduce the 
intention to violate security policies such as sharing 
passwords. In other words, using theoretical levers 
informed by prior theory and empirical research 
related to security violation intentions, we designed 
SETA interventions to reinforce acceptable behaviors. 
Our focus is on situations in which it would be easy 
to rationalize security violations, so we also 
investigate the extent to which neutralization 
influences violation intentions. Figure 1 presents our 
conceptual model. The sections below describe each 
aspect in more detail. 
 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual Model and Hypotheses 
 
2.1 Neutralizing Theory 
Neutralization is defined as the use of rationalizations 
when violating a policy (Sykes & Matza, 1957). 
Neutralization theory, which originated from 
criminology research, identifies various forms of 
rationalization, termed “neutralization techniques” 
(Sykes & Matza, 1957). Individuals apply these 
techniques in noncriminal rule-breaking actions 
(Pershing, 2003). The original list of five 
neutralization techniques identified by Sykes and 
Matza (1957) has been extended to a list of 17 
different neutralization techniques (Willison & 
Warkentin, 2013). Two examples are denial of injury 
and defense of necessity. In the instance of denial of 
injury, offenders perceive their behavior has no direct 
harmful consequences to the victim (Henry, 2009; 
Sykes & Matza, 1957); therefore, they rationalize 
their noncompliant behavior saying, “I didn’t really 
hurt anybody.” An individual rationalizing their 
behavior using the defense of necessity technique 
believes that he or she has no choice under the given 
circumstances but to engage in certain behavior 
(Cromwell & Thurman, 2003; Minor, 1981). For 
example, consider a security policy that discourages 
employees from writing down passwords, yet because 
they cannot remember them, they write them down. 
Alternatively, consider a policy that requires a data 
encryption procedure for all data transferred to a USB 
drive, but employees feel is too time-consuming to 
perform; employees could use neutralization techniques to 
justify violating security policies for “practical” reasons.1  
Siponen and Vance (2010) applied neutralization 
theory to information security policy research; they 
                                                     
1 We use USBs as an example, although we examined only 
password security in our experiment. 




investigated specific neutralization techniques and 
found them to be more powerful than sanctions in 
predicting employee violations of information 
security policies. Subsequent research confirms that 
neutralization techniques are an important predictor 
of information security violations (Warkentin, 
Willison, & Johnston, 2011; Willison & Warkentin, 
2010; Willison & Warkentin, 2013). Further, Willison 
and Warkentin (2013) call for more research into the 
role of neutralization in information security 
violations.  
Neutralization theory proposes that when an 
individual considers violating a rule, cognitive 
dissonance exists between perceptions that an action 
is justifiable and knowledge that policy prohibits the 
action. In other words, the person cognitively reasons 
that the potential action is simultaneously wrong 
(according to the policy) and right (for some 
justifiable, context-specific reason) (Festinger, 1957). 
Neutralization techniques resolve, or at least reduce, 
the cognitive dissonance by changing the individual’s 
perceptions of the negative consequences of violating 
the rule. By reducing perceptions of negative 
consequences, the individual chooses to violate the 
rule because there is less dissonance between the 
positive and negative outcomes of the behavior. 
Essentially, neutralization reduces or eliminates the 
perceived negative consequences associated with 
formal sanctions, informal sanctions, and/or shame 
from violating the policy (Paternoster & Simpson, 
1996; Siponen & Vance, 2010). Neutralization may 
even cause violators to perceive their behavior to be 
less risky. Though research has already shown the 
power of neutralization in affecting security behavior 
intentions, we hypothesize and test this effect as a 
baseline for our remaining hypotheses. In essence, we 
first test that neutralization will have an effect in our 
specific study to validate the power of influence 
statements in situations where individuals rationalize 
insecure behavior. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H1: Employees using neutralization are more likely 
to form intentions to violate an information 
security policy. 
2.2 Persuasive Information Security 
Communication 
Given the considerable impact that neutralization has 
on violation intentions, the purpose of this study was 
to understand which types of influence 
communication induce good security behaviors while 
reducing the effects of neutralization. A vast amount 
of information security research has determined that 
deterrent-focused communication reduces violation 
intentions. Barlow et al. (2013) demonstrated that 
neutralization-focused communication is just as 
effective as deterrent-focused communication. Our 
study extends this research by separately examining 
three different types of communication 
(informational, normative, and antineutralization) and 
testing their individual effects on intentions to violate 
information security policies. Both informational and 
normative statements are adapted from prior theory 
whereas antineutralization statements are a third 
theory-based approach we created for this study. 
2.2.1 Informational Communication 
Individuals can be persuaded by detailed information 
about alternatives when they deeply consider new 
information about them (Aronson et al., 2005; 
Dennis, 1996; Dennis, Hilmer, & Taylor, 1998). 
Informational influence occurs when “behavior is 
based on a personal evaluation of the information 
provided” (Subramani & Rajagopalan, 2003). 
Informational influence is driven by the direct 
evaluation of the costs and benefits of the behavior 
(Subramani & Rajagopalan, 2003). With 
informational influence, individuals actively consider 
information given to them and incorporate the 
information into their existing mental schemas (Petty 
& Cacioppo, 1986). When the goal is to influence 
individuals to abstain from engaging in a specific 
behavior, then information that highlights the costs of 
that behavior may influence them to abstain. Within 
the IS security literature, some studies have examined 
the effect of perceptions of benefits and costs of 
noncompliance and found that such perceptions make 
a difference (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Xue, Liang, & 
Wu, 2011). Thus there is a need to understand if such 
perceptions can be intentionally influenced by 
informational communication to the employee.  
Our focus is on the direct costs of the security 
violation behavior itself, not on indirect costs, such as 
sanctions designed to deter such behavior. We focus 
on direct costs because other research has 
demonstrated sanctions to have some, albeit limited, 
effect and because sanctions are theoretically distinct 
from direct consequences of the behavior; that is, they 
are externally imposed, rather than being directly 
inherent to the behavior itself (Johnston et al., 2015; 
Son, 2011). Thus rather than simply stating a policy 
and expecting employees to comply with it, SETA 
communications following this theoretical path 
include statements that give information about the 
consequences of engaging in a proscribed behavior or 
failing to engage in a required behavior. For example, 
communication regarding a password policy 
prohibiting password sharing would explain how 
unauthorized access to private data could occur 
through sharing passwords. Similarly, communication 
about a policy requiring USB drives to be encrypted 
would explain how unauthorized access to private 
data could occur if the USB were not encrypted and 
subsequently lost. The goal of these communications 
is to prompt the individual to engage in a thoughtful 





consideration of the information behind the policy so 
that he or she concludes that the behavior desired by 
the policy is the appropriate behavior. Ideally, this 
conclusion would be strong enough for the individual 
to perform the desired behavior even in the absence 
of a policy.  
Empirical evidence suggests that individuals assess 
information supporting a security policy when they 
consider engaging in a policy-violating action 
(Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010) and use moral 
reasoning to come to a decision (Myyry, Siponen, 
Pahnila, Vartiainen, & Vance, 2009). Several studies 
providing information using fear appeals or dialogue 
and reflection show that providing information about 
a threat and a response that can mitigate the threat 
influences compliance behavior (Albrechtsen & 
Hovden, 2010; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; 
Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010). Such studies suggest 
that by providing appropriate supporting information 
about the reasons for security policies, organizations 
may positively influence employee security 
behaviors (Liang & Xue, 2009). Although these 
prior studies demonstrate that information influences 
security behavior, they have not examined this 
influence in situations where the potential benefits 
of security policy violations are so great that the 
decision calculus is altered and employees are more 
likely to neutralize their violation behavior.  
A search of prior research reveals only one study that 
actually examined whether providing information 
about the consequences of security policy violations 
influences violation behavior. In an action research 
study of a Finnish company, researchers started by 
delivering a three-session multihour training program 
on the policy of encrypting emails containing 
confidential information (Puhakainen & Siponen, 
2010). The first training session was a presentation of 
the risks related to the use of email, followed by 
employees searching their own emails to find sample 
emails that contained confidential information as defined 
by the security policy, and then asking employees to 
identify the consequences if this information were to be 
discovered by competitors. The second session was only 
for nontechnical users and focused on how to use the 
encryption software to email encrypted documents, 
including sharing encryption passwords with the 
receiver over the phone. The third session reviewed the 
issues covered in the first two sessions.   
By the end of the sessions, nine employees 
understood the information describing the rationale 
for the policy and expressed a willingness to comply 
with it, whereas five other employees felt the policy 
“was still too far removed from” the company’s other 
activities and thus were not motivated to comply. A 
broader second round of information-based security 
training was delivered to the entire company once a 
month. After three months, this program was 
determined to be ineffective in influencing 
employees’ motivation to comply with security 
policy. At that point, the CEO stepped in and made 
security his priority in monthly meetings. Two 
months later, five employees reported that they were 
more motivated to comply.   
One important difference between the Puhakainen 
and Siponen (2010) study and ours is the nature of the 
SETA communication. Puhakainen and Siponen 
(2010) examined the effects of a long face-to-face 
training session. In contrast, we are interested in a 
specific type of short written reinforcing 
communication, sometimes characterized as 
“nudges” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Though 
there are some similarities, brief SETA 
communication is fundamentally different from 
in-depth SETA training, making it unclear about 
the extent to which the results from Puhakainen 
and Siponen (2010) would generalize to our 
setting.   
Further, the Puhakainen and Siponen (2010) study did 
not analyze whether the informational persuasion 
technique would be strong enough in situations where 
employees might commonly neutralize their behavior. 
Neutralization theory posits that individuals use 
rationalizations when faced with conflicting values 
(i.e., benefits of violating vs. risks of violating). 
Informational communication should help resolve the 
cognitive dissonance individuals feel when they are in 
a situation where noncompliance would seemingly 
result in some benefit (e.g., convenience), by 
reminding them of the reason for the policy and 
increasing the perception of compliance benefits.  
In summary, theory suggests that communicating 
information about the consequences of security policy 
violation prior to a violation decision should 
influence behavior, but the empirical evidence (which 
studied training, not communication) is unclear. We 
rely on the former argument and hypothesize: 
H2: Employees receiving written communication 
containing informational influence statements 
are less likely to form intentions to violate an 
information security policy. 
2.3 Normative Communication 
Normative influence occurs when individuals use the 
beliefs and actions of others as a guide for their own 
behavior, rather than using their own understanding 
of the available information to form their decision 
(Aronson et al., 2005). Normative influence is based 
on the expectation of a need to conform to the others’ 
behavior (Subramani & Rajagopalan, 2003). 
Individuals who experience normative influence 
comply due to the desire for social support or to avoid 
social sigma (Ajzen, 2002; Kim & Kankanhalli, 
2009). Given the social expectations involved with 




normative influence, behavior induced by normative 
influence is more likely to be discontinued when it is 
no longer observable (Subramani & Rajagopalan, 
2003).   
Normative influence has been theorized to influence 
decisions about whether or not to violate security 
policy (Liang & Xue, 2009). Past empirical research 
suggests that normative beliefs (e.g., subjective 
norms) play a significant role in the decision to 
violate a policy (Herath & Rao, 2009; Ifinedo, 2012; 
Ifinedo, 2014; Siponen, Mahmood, & Pahnila, 2014), 
a role as important as informational influence 
(Bulgurcu et al. 2010). Several studies (Chatterjee, 
Sarker, & Valacich, 2015; Lowry & Moody, 2014; 
Siponen et al., 2014) examined individuals’ self-
reported post hoc perceptions of the factors 
influencing their behavior after making a decision 
about whether to not to violate a policy. That is, when 
asked after the fact, some users say normative 
influence affected their security decisions. These 
studies do not directly address the question of 
whether providing normative information before a 
decision changes intentions or behavior, but they 
suggest that intentionally crafting a message designed 
to provide normative influence before the decision 
would influence behavior. 
We argue that providing normative information that 
purports to describe what others would do in a similar 
situation will influence security violation decisions. 
For example, individuals who are motivated by 
normative information are more likely to comply with 
information security policy when subjective norms 
suggest that many other employees would be likely to 
comply (Herath & Rao, 2009; Ifinedo, 2014). 
Normative influence is a factor driven by an 
individual’s understanding of his or her own 
reference group, such as peers (Bulgurcu et al., 2010). 
It is unclear whether SETA communication 
containing statements about others would influence 
behavior. Nonetheless, normative beliefs are often 
very powerful, and normative influence from SETA 
communication may help employees resolve the 
cognitive dissonance felt in situations where there are 
benefits for both compliance and noncompliance. 
Thus, we posit that: 
H3: Employees receiving written communication 
containing normative influence statements are less 
likely to form intentions to violate an information 
security policy. 
2.3.1 Antineutralization Communication 
With information influence and normative influence, 
the facts about the situation (information influence) 
and perceptions of what others would do (normative 
influence) drive compliance decisions. Neutralization 
involves rationalizing away the information influence 
and normative influence factors that support 
compliance so that they become less important than 
the factors favoring noncompliance. Neutralization is 
often more powerful than information and norms, and 
even more powerful than deterrent sanctions (Silic, 
Barlow, & Back, 2017; Siponen & Vance, 2010). 
Employees often use neutralization when they 
encounter strong sanctions, especially when they feel 
their organization is treating them unjustly 
(Warkentin et al., 2011; Willison & Warkentin, 
2013).   
In this section, we focus on a third potential type of 
security communication that focuses on the 
neutralization process, not the underlying situation in 
which employees find themselves. Antineutralization 
communication does not address the situation. Rather it 
is separate and distinct in that it focuses on neutralization 
behaviors that are not tied to the specific situation. 
Neutralization behaviors are often driven by cognitive 
dissonance. Good security behaviors often entail a 
cost to the employee by requiring extra effort (e.g., 
logging off a computer when they leave their desk, 
encrypting a USB drive, or choosing new complex 
passwords that are hard to remember for each 
resource). When employees perceive extra costs from 
complying with a policy, they may experience 
cognitive dissonance between those factors that 
motivate compliance and noncompliance. This 
confounds the compliance decision calculus, causing 
them to be tempted to violate the policies. Employees 
may consider rationalizing their behavior, which has 
been shown to strengthen the relationship between 
perceived injustice and computer abuse intentions 
(Warkentin et al., 2011; Willison et al., 2018) as well as 
directly influence deviant behavior such as intention to 
violate policies (Siponen & Vance, 2010) and 
cyberloafing (Lim, 2002).   
Justifications for negative security-related behavior 
may be based on certain heuristics or biases, such as 
anchoring, optimism bias, loss aversion, etc. (Tsohou, 
Karyda, & Kokolakis, 2015). For example, with the 
denial of injury neutralization technique, employees 
may be biased in their judgments of the harm that 
could be caused by potential security violations. 
Training against such processes should allow 
employees to more carefully think through their 
decision-making process by making them aware of 
their biases. SETA programs have been shown to 
effectively deter misuse, and the IS security literature 
calls for more research to develop practical SETA 
techniques (D’Arcy et al., 2009; Dhillon, 1999; 
Posey, Roberts, & Lowry, 2015; Straub & Welke, 
1998). Integrating training against neutralizations into 
these SETA programs and other training materials 
would help users become more cognizant of thought 
processes that may have negative consequences on 
both the organization and the individual; therefore, 





they may be effective in deterring individuals from 
acting on these thoughts.  
Because employee rationalizations make violation 
decisions more attractive by serving to eliminate such 
cognitive dissonance, organizational training against 
neutralization can be used to discourage these 
justifications (Barlow et al., 2013; Willison et al., 
2018). Antineutralization communication focuses on 
this cognitive dissonance by arguing that employees 
should never rationalize such violations. 
Antineutralization communication argues that there 
are no situational ethics; that is, there are no situations 
in which violations can be justified. Note that 
antineutralization communication is not specific to 
the situation because its focus is neutralization (in 
contrast, both information influence and normative 
influence focus on the specific situation).  
Antineutralization communication can be 
neutralization specific (e.g., targeting defense of 
necessity by arguing there is always an alternative to 
violating a policy or targeting denial of injury by 
arguing there is always the possibility for harm). By 
explicitly recognizing the process of rationalization, 
antineutralization communication aims to encourage 
employees not to rationalize to reduce dissonance. 
Rather, employees will be persuaded that when 
rationalizations come to mind, the correct course of 
action is to ignore them and comply with the policy.   
Antineutralization statements will have the greatest 
effect—perhaps the only effect—when neutralization is 
strong by acting to reduce its effects on intentions; 
without neutralization, antineutralization communication 
is likely to have little effect, although there is the 
opportunity for neutralization in most compliance 
situations because compliance requires additional effort. 
Thus, communication focused on mitigating 
neutralization may reduce rationalization behaviors and 
ultimately intentions to violate security policy.   
One previous study (Barlow et al., 2013) tested the 
effects of “neutralization focused” communication. 
The study used a factorial survey of 360 respondents 
to examine the effects of antineutralization 
communication, deterrence communication, and 
message framing (positive vs. negative). They found 
that antineutralization communication significantly 
reduced violation intentions and was comparable in 
impact to deterrence communication. The 
antineutralization treatment also included 
information-based statements, so it was not a test of 
antineutralization communication separate from 
information-based communication; rather, it was a 
test of the combined effects of both information and 
antineutralization. Therefore, it is still unclear 
whether antineutralization communication alone can 
cognitively influence individuals’ security intentions 
in a different manner than the two more traditionally 
studied forms of influence (informational and 
normative). Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H4: Employees receiving written communication 
containing antineutralization statements are less 
likely to form intentions to violate an 
information security policy.  
3 Method 
We applied the factorial survey method design to test 
our hypotheses (Jasso, 2006; Rossi & Anderson, 
1982; Shlay, Tran, Weinraub, & Harmon, 2005; 
Wallander, 2009). In the scenario-based factorial 
survey design, participants read several unique 
scenarios that contain a subset of the experimental 
treatments and then answer survey questions based on 
their perceptions of each scenario. Various versions 
of the baseline scenario embed language that 
orthogonally represents the independent variables 
under investigation (thereby eliminating the 
possibility of multicollinearity between predictor 
variables), and the respondent is asked if he or she 
would act in the same way as the scenario character 
(thus, intentions serve as the dependent variable). 
Security and business ethics researchers often use 
scenario-based methods (Herzog, 2003; Seron, 
Pereira, & Kovath, 2006; Trevino, 1992; Weber, 
1992) because it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
measure actual deviant behavior in the workplace by 
observation or direct questioning, in part due to social 
desirability bias. Instead, participants report whether 
they would act in a similar manner as a character in 
the scenario (Harrington, 1996; Trevino, 1992), 
thereby removing feelings of incrimination for 
violating behaviors while still capturing intentions 
(Crossler et al., 2013). Vance, et al. (2015, p. 353) 
point out that scenarios “afford an indirect way of 
measuring the intention to commit unethical 
behavior” by using hypothetical terms. The scenario 
technique is the most common method in studies of 
ethical issues (O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005) and is 
increasingly applied to study IT security policy 
violations (Argelaguet, Kulik, Kunert, Andujar, & 
Froehlich, 2011; Barlow et al., 2013; Goel, Williams, 
& Dincelli, 2017; Guo, Yuan, Archer, & Connelly, 
2011; Johnston et al., 2016; Trinkle, Crossler, & 
Warkentin, 2014; Willison et al., 2018). However, 
some of these security studies used scenarios without 
the use of the factorial survey methodology. The 
factorial survey method utilizes a full factorial of all 
realistic combinations of all levels and dimensions of 
each variable being investigated, whereas scenario-
based surveys may not incorporate the complete 
calculus of the relationships between all model 
components. Furthermore, multiple versions of the 
scenario or vignette are repeated within the study, 
possibly evaluated numerous times by numerous 
respondents, which strengthens the value of the 




factorial survey method. For further elaboration of 
this method, see Vance, Lowry, & Eggett (2015) and 
Willison et al. (2018).  
Before distributing the scenario-based survey, we 
convened an expert review panel, as suggested in 
previous research (Straub, Boudreau, & Gefen, 2004), 
to ensure realism, content validity, and face validity. 
The panel consisted of experts in instrumentation and 
scale development, as well as experienced security 
experts providing feedback on generalizability and 
realism of scenarios. As a result of the panel review, 
we revised the survey instrument and scenarios to be 
more comprehensive and realistic; our revisions also 
reduced ambiguity and potential survey fatigue 
(Lanza, 1988; Lauder, 2002). We then conducted a 
small pilot study with a convenience sample to 
confirm discriminant and convergent validity before 
primary data collection commenced. Survey metadata 
confirmed completion time estimates and other 
factors. 
3.1 Participants 
Participants were recruited through Qualtrics, a 
survey and Internet panel provider firm. Qualtrics 
recruited U.S. participants who passed filter questions 
indicating they had full-time experience in a 
workplace using computers and security policies. All 
subjects completed the survey anonymously. To 
prevent survey fatigue and reduce learning effects and 
hypothesis guessing, each participant completed a 
random set of two (out of 24 possible) scenarios. 
After rigorous manipulation checks and quality 
checks, our final data sample consisted of 200 
participants, or 400 scenario responses. See Appendix 
C for more details on recruitment and participant 
filtering procedures. 
3.2 Task 
Each participant completed the online survey at his or 
her convenience. The respondents read two scenarios 
that detailed violations of information security 
policies in familiar situations. First, the scenario 
introduced a hypothetical company that had 
established information security policies and 
procedures related to password sharing. Next, 
respondents read a (randomly assigned) combination 
of up to three persuasion statements—a normative 
influence statement, an antineutralization statement, 
and an informational influence statement. Then, the 
scenario described a situation where a particular 
employee of the hypothetical company violated the 
information security policy by sharing his computer 
password because the fictional individual concluded 
that there were benefits to noncompliance. Finally, 
we collected responses to various items, including the 
violation intention of the participant if they 
experienced similar circumstances. Each participant 
repeated this task with a second (randomly generated) 
scenario. See Appendix A for the full text of the 
scenario combinations. 
3.3 Experimental Treatments 
To test our hypotheses, we conducted a 2 (normative 
influence statement present or not) x 2 
(antineutralization statement present or not) x 2 
(informational influence statement present or not) x 3 
(“denial of injury” neutralization statement, “defense 
of necessity” neutralization statement, or no 
neutralization statement) factorial design.  
In the normative influence treatment, the scenario 
reported that a large majority of employees would 
comply with the policy in all situations (as 
determined by a company survey). In the 
antineutralization treatment, the scenario stated that 
employees should not violate the policy even when 
they perceive justification of the action as an option. 
In the informational influence treatment, the scenario 
stated that the reason for the policy was that sharing 
passwords may result in serious consequences, such 
as malicious deviant behavior by the employee with 
whom the password is shared. Finally, in the 
neutralization statement treatment, a sentence at the 
end included the rationalization for violating an IT 
policy. Some versions of this treatment used the 
“denial of injury” technique, where the employee 
feels that no harm would result from violation 
(Siponen & Vance, 2010; Warkentin et al., 2011). 
Other versions used the “defense of necessity” 
technique, where the employee feels that violation is 
necessary for a greater cause (Siponen & Vance, 
2010). We chose these techniques because they are 
particularly relevant to password sharing; our expert 
panel reviewers agreed that these rationalizations 
were realistic in the scenarios. We note that not all 
neutralization techniques are equal; some are more 
powerful than others depending on the individual and 
the situation (Barlow et al., 2013). 
3.4 Dependent Variable Measurement 
We asked each respondent to rate the likelihood that 
he or she would violate the given security policy 
under similar circumstances (Paternoster & Simpson, 
1996; Siponen & Vance, 2010). To avoid reliability 
issues, we used four items for the dependent variable 
(see Appendix B), with each item using a fully 
anchored five-point Likert-type scale ranging from 
strongly disagree to strongly agree. The Cronbach’s 
alpha was .929, indicating adequate reliability. 
3.5 Experimental Procedures 
Participants received a link to participate in the study 
from Qualtrics. After completing a consent statement, 
each person answered two filter questions gauging 





whether he or she had experience in a company with 
computers and formal policies (see Appendix B). If 
the participants answered negatively to either of the 
questions, the survey ended.   
Following the filter questions, participants viewed a 
scenario, randomly assigned from the full set of 
scenarios, using the Qualtrics randomization feature, 
immediately followed by a set of manipulation check 
questions. We designed the manipulation check 
questions to ensure that the participant understood the 
scenario correctly in accordance with the experimental 
manipulations. Failure of manipulation check questions 
in experimental or survey research is highly correlated 
with lack of motivation and/or disregard to instructions 
from the researcher (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & 
Davidenko, 2009). Data from participants who fail 
manipulation checks should thus be excluded from 
analysis (Oppenheimer et al., 2009). Participants 
received up to four manipulation questions, one each for 
the four dimensions of the study (i.e., antineutralization 
statement, normative statement, informational statement, 
and neutralization type). These manipulation questions 
are included in Appendix B. The participants only 
viewed manipulation check questions for the 
manipulations present in the scenario they experienced, 
so that the question would not induce bias or prime the 
participant.  
After the manipulation check questions, participants 
responded to four dependent variable items and two 
additional items. First, a response set item (e.g., “select 
disagree as the response to this question”) was used to 
ensure responses were based on attentive reading of the 
question rather than simply answering in patterns and 
not paying attention (Andrich, 1978; Kerlinger, 1973). 
Second, a realism item (i.e., “I could imagine a similar 
scenario taking place at my company”) was used as a 
control variable (Siponen & Vance, 2010). After 
completing two scenarios, participants answered a set of 
demographic questions. (See Appendix B for all 
measures.) In the factorial survey method, participants 
often view and respond to many different scenarios. 
However, we decided to limit the number of scenarios to 
two per participant to reduce survey fatigue and learning 
effects. 
3.6 Addressing Potential Bias 
Because various forms of bias, including common 
method bias, are a serious concern for field studies 
and surveys (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & 
Podsakoff, 2003), we followed the recommendations 
of Podsakoff et al. (2003) to address a number of 
specific potential bias threats, and to ameliorate their 
potential. A common issue that threatens field studies, 
especially in the information security field, is social 
desirability, the tendency to respond to questions in a 
culturally acceptable way (Podsakoff et al., 2003). We 
addressed social desirability by, first, using the scenario 
technique rather than direct questions. This technique 
increases the likelihood that participants will give true 
responses about information security policy violation 
intentions (Trevino, 1992). Second, participant 
responses were completely anonymous, as we did not 
receive any personally identifiable information from 
Qualtrics.  
To address common method bias, we randomized the 
set of scenarios that each participant would receive to 
reduce tendencies to answer questions about each 
scenario based on previous scenarios. Another way 
we addressed common method bias was to use the 
response set question (Andrich, 1978; Kerlinger, 
1973; Rennie, 1982) to ensure that participants would 
not simply give patterned, automatic responses. 
Further, we used manipulation check questions to 
ensure attention to response—any incorrect response 
to manipulation check questions resulted in 
discarding the responses for that scenario. 
Another important issue was to ensure realism of the 
scenarios to encourage responses that are more valid. 
First, two expert panels reviewed the scenarios and 
questions to ensure realism. Second, we included the 
realism question in the survey to control for the 
effects of scenario realism (Siponen & Vance, 2010). 
Finally, the response set and realism questions were 
intermixed with dependent variable items to avoid 
grouping constructs (Podsakoff et al., 2003). 
4 Results 
The final data set consisted of 200 individuals, 
answering two scenarios each, resulting in a sample 
size of 400. Demographic information is summarized 
in Table 1. As a robustness check, we also repeated 
the analysis on data including participants who were 
filtered out of the final data set. The results of this 
data analysis are summarized in Appendix C.  
Ordinary least squares regression (OLS) is a preferred 
technique for the factorial survey design (Rossi & 
Anderson, 1982; Shlay et al., 2005) due to the ease of 
interpreting coefficients. However, OLS requires a 
normal distribution of the dependent variable. In 
behavioral security research, the dependent variable 
often displays a skewed distribution because of the 
sensitive nature of admitting guilt to violating rules




Table 1. Demographic Information 
Gender Work experience in years (mean = 24.2) 
Female 121 (60.5%) 1-10 32 (16.0%) 
Male 78 (43.3%) 11-20 48 (24.0%) 
Unspecified 1 (0.5%) 21-30 58 (29.0%) 
Age (mean = 45.4) 31-40 42 (21.0%) 
20-29 29 (14.5%) 41-51 19 (9.5%) 
30-39 40 (20.0%) Unspecified 1 (0.5%) 
40-49 47 (23.5%) Level of education completed 
50-59 55 (27.5%) High school 58 (29.0%) 
60-71 29 (14.5%) Undergraduate degree 83 (41.5%) 
  Graduate degree 59 (29.5%) 
The Kolgomorov-Smirnov (0.180; df = 400; p < 
0.001) and Shapiro Wilk (0.870; df = 400; p < 0.001) 
tests of normality both indicated that our data are not 
normally distributed. Another assumption of OLS 
regression is independence of errors. Repeated-
measures designs violate this assumption because 
responses from the same subject are likely to be 
correlated. As an alternative to OLS regression, Rossi 
and Anderson (1982) note that any multivariate 
technique that fits the data can be used for the 
factorial survey design. We chose to analyze the data 
using the “generalized linear mixed models” function 
in SPSS 24.0.0.0 (see syntax in Appendix F). This 
analysis approach allows for robust estimation to 
handle violations of distribution assumptions; it also 
allows for correlated observations (such as when 
participants view multiple scenarios) (Vance et al., 
2015).  
Table 2 lists the full results of the data analysis as 
well as a follow-up analysis with selected scenarios; 
we focus on the full results first. In our model, the 
base level can be interpreted as the scenarios where 
the manipulation statement was not present. For 
example, the parameters listed for the normative 
influence statement variable in the “Full results” 
columns of Table 2 indicate the difference between 
scenarios with this manipulation and those scenarios 
without it. 
Table 2. Results for Intention to Violate the Security Policy 
 Full results 
Only scenarios with neutralization 
present 
 Estimate p Estimate P 
Intercept -0.443 0.216 -0.026 0.949 
Use of neutralization techniques 0.227* 0.026 n/a n/a 
Informational influence statement -0.175† 0.092 -0.202 0.107 
Normative influence statement 0.065 0.493 0.061 0.617 
Antineutralization influence statement -0.320** 0.001 0.369** 0.002 
Order -0.142* 0.010 -0.123 0.168 
Realism 0.058 0.267 -0.013 0.835 
Gender (Female) 0.092 0.465 0.085 0.572 
Age 0.000 0.982 -0.005 0.676 
Work experience -0.005 0.624 -0.004 0.701 
Education 0.097 0.558 0.077 0.698 
Note: †p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p <0.01; *** p < 0.01;                                     n = 400 scenarios           n = 266 scenarios 
These results show that participants who viewed 
scenarios in which a neutralization technique was 
present were significantly more likely to form 
information security policy violation intentions (p = 
.026), providing support for Hypothesis 1. 
Participants who received a scenario containing 
informational statements were less likely to form 
information security policy violation intentions (p = 
.092), as were those receiving antineutralization 
statements (p = .001). However, there were no 
significant effects for normative influence statements 
(p = .493). These results provide support for 





Hypotheses 2 and 4, but not Hypothesis 3. The raw 
data for intention scores are shown in Appendix D.  
The two rightmost columns in Table 2 show the 
results when analyzing only the scenarios where a 
neutralization technique was used. That is, in addition 
to testing the effects of the various persuasion 
techniques on violation intentions in general, we also 
tested the effects of the techniques in situations where 
participants were highly prone to neutralize their 
behavior. In this situation, we see that 
antineutralization statements had a significant impact 
on behavior (p = .002), but information influence (p = 
.107) and normative influence statements (p = .617) 
did not. These results require some qualification to 
our conclusions about Hypothesis 2 that information 
influence statements affect behavior, because it is not 
supported when neutralization is high (and the 
significance levels were near 0.10 in the full data set). 
When neutralization is high, only antineutralization 
statements have an impact. Table 3 summarizes the 
support for each hypothesis. 
 
Table 3. Summary of Hypotheses 
H1. Use of neutralization techniques  Higher intentions to violate Supported 
H2. Informational influence statements  Lower intentions to violate Weakly supported 
H3. Normative influence statements  Lower intentions to violate Not supported 
H4. Antineutralization statements  Lower intentions to violate Supported 
  
To test order effects between the two scenarios that 
participants viewed, we used a dummy variable coded 
as whether the scenario was the first or second the 
participant had experienced. Scenario order had a 
statistically significant effect on intentions overall 
(but not for scenarios with neutralizations present), 
with first scenarios being rated with higher 
information security policy violation intentions than 
subsequent scenarios. This order effect indicates that 
as participants viewed additional influential 
communication in the scenarios, their information 
security policy violation intentions decreased. This 
indicates that viewing a second repetition of the 
security policy (without viewing possible 
neutralization statements) increased the strength of 
the security policy, while viewing both the policy and 
neutralization statements twice had no effect (i.e., 
they cancelled each other out); thus we conclude that 
the policy statement had the desired effect in 
increasing compliance (although that is not part of our 
research question). We also tested order as a 
moderator of the relationships between the main 
variables and the dependent variable; none of these 
tests was statistically significant, indicating that the 
order in which a person viewed the scenarios did not 
have an effect on other relationships in the model.   
As a final check for order effects, we ran a separate 
model with only those scenarios first seen by a 
participant; this resulted in similar parameter 
estimates to the original model. However, the 
statistical significance was not as strong. 
Interestingly, the explicit use of neutralization 
techniques in the scenario was no longer statistically 
significantly related to intentions to violate the policy. 
Informational statements, which were significant at 
the p<0.1 level in the main results, did not have a 
statistically significant effect when analyzing only the 
first scenarios. However, it should be noted that the 
coefficient (β = -0.188) is actually greater than in the 
main results (β = -0.175), but cutting the sample size in 
half greatly increased the p value. That is, the effect size 
is similar, but the statistical significance is weak. See 
Appendix C.  
The perceived realism of the scenarios did not have a 
statistically significant effect on how the participants 
rated their intentions. Furthermore, running the model 
on a data set that discards responses with low rated 
realism shows results with parameters and 
significance tests similar to the main model. 
Because we used two types of neutralization 
techniques in the scenario for more generalizability, 
we conducted post hoc testing to investigate any 
differences between the effects of these techniques. 
Interestingly, we found that when testing them 
separately, the defense of necessity technique was 
significantly related to information security policy 
violation intentions (β = 0.320; p = 0.008), whereas 
the denial of injury technique was not (β = 0.075; p = 
0.534). Participants were more likely to express 
intentions to violate the policy when they felt it was 
necessary than they were when they believed no one 
would be injured. However, the antineutralization was 
just as powerful in the denial of injury scenarios as in the 
defense of necessity scenarios, suggesting that whether 
we indicated a specific type of neutralization to the 
participant explicitly or not, the antineutralization 
statement influenced them to be less likely to violate. 
These results are summarized in Table 4. 
 




Table 4. Results Comparing Denial of Injury and Defense of Necessity Separately to Baseline Scenarios with No 
Neutralization Statement  
  Denial of injury (vs. baseline) Defense of necessity (vs. baseline) 
 Estimate p Estimate P 
Intercept -0.580 0.135 -0.762 0.080 
Use of neutralization techniques 0.075 0.534 0.320** 0.008 
Informational influence statement -0.149 0.219 -0.168 0.187 
Normative influence statement 0.123 0.321 -0.017 0.873 
Antineutralization influence statement -0.280* 0.021 -0.274* 0.013 
Order 0.084 0.318 -0.380** <0.001 
Realism 0.112† 0.060 0.089 0.145 
Gender (Female) 0.174 0.220 0.020 0.891 
Age -0.002 0.850 0.008 0.476 
Work experience -0.004 0.718 -0.009 0.440 
Education 0.162 0.360 0.056 0.761 
Note : †p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p <0.01; *** p < 0.01;                         n = 259 scenarios                                       n = 275 scenarios  
We also analyzed all interaction effects between 
neutralization types and the hypothesized effects of 
informational, normative, and antineutralization 
statements and found no significant results (see 
Appendix E). In other words, the effects of the 
different types of persuasion were similar regardless 
of the specific neutralization type used in the various 
scenarios. It is possible that even in situations where 
we did not present an explicit neutralization statement 
in a scenario, participants came up with possible 
rationalizations of their own. Even when we 
presented an explicit neutralization statement, 
participants may have thought of other potential 
justifications as well. This result further strengthens 
the contribution of our findings in that we can be 
more confident that antineutralization statements are 
influential against multiple types of neutralization 
techniques. It would be difficult for organizations to 
use different techniques against different 
neutralizations that different employees might choose 
to use. 
5 Discussion 
5.1 Interpretation of Results 
This study shows that the way organizations 
communicate security policies can increase 
compliance, over and above sanctions that are in 
place to deter violations, particularly in those 
situations where individuals consider benefits of 
noncompliance. First, above and beyond the 
enforcing behaviors implemented by organizations 
(e.g., sanctions, formal SETA programs), we show 
that reinforcing the need for secure behavior through 
short communications, including even brief 
informational statements that highlight the reasons 
why information security policies exist (i.e., the direct 
negative consequences of noncompliant behavior), 
increases the likelihood that employees will comply 
with the policy. When cognitive dissonance between 
violating information security policy and complying 
with information security policy exists, informational 
statements aid in decision making by reminding 
employees of reasons to comply. Such reminders 
should help employees decide on compliance based 
on a rational decision-making rather than justifying 
violation behavior through neutralization techniques 
or rash decisions. However, this effect is diminished 
in situations where an individual is more strongly 
tempted to neutralize. In scenarios where a 
neutralization technique was explicitly stated, the 
effect of informational communication was not 
statistically significant.  
Second, statements specifically designed to counter 
neutralization techniques (i.e., “antineutralization”) 
significantly reduced the intention to violate the 
policy. Antineutralization statements had the same 
effect whether informational statements were present 
or not, indicating that they were processed in a 
different manner than informational statements. 
Likewise, antineutralization statements had the same 
effect whether neutralization statements were present 
or not. Reinforcing communication that states that 
neutralization is unacceptable effectively combats 
rationalizations that lead to deviant behavior, whether 
rationalizations are explicitly triggered by the 
communication or spontaneously invoked by the 
users.  
Interestingly, our results show that short normative 
statements in reinforcing communication do not 
reduce intentions to violate information security 
policy. For employees who contemplate rationalizing 





violation, reading normative information did not 
increase compliance behavior. This finding is in 
contrast to previous research that has shown that 
internally held normative beliefs influence behavior 
(Bulgurcu et al., 2010); however, in situations where 
rationalization is possible and even probable, the 
effects of normative communication are not powerful 
enough to convince employees to comply with 
security policies. Normative influence may be 
powerful if it is a deeply held individual belief, but it 
is not as powerful in the form of short reinforcement 
statements from the organization. Normative 
influence tends to be more powerful when 
individuals are closer in “proximity” (whether 
space or time) to others whose norms they are 
considering (Latané, 1981). That is, norms may 
influence security behavior, but the normative 
influence individuals experience directly from their 
peers is likely stronger that reading normative 
information in SETA communication from the 
organization. While previous research has shown 
that normative influence plays a role in security 
behavior, our findings highlight the fact that 
knowing antecedents of behavior cannot directly 
translate into knowing how to implement 
meaningful interventions in practice. 
5.2 Limitations 
One limitation is that we studied short, focused SETA 
communications. We followed prior theory (and most 
empirical research) on information influence and 
normative influence, which has focused on how simple 
short communication can influence behavior. Though 
our use of theory here is a good match with the 
underlying theory and prior research, simple short 
communication is likely to have a weaker effect than the 
use of active learning techniques used in SETA training 
that are likely to stimulate deeper consideration of the 
message content. For example, compare our 
intervention, which took minutes, to the intervention of 
Puhakainen and Siponen (2010), which took hours.   
Another potential limitation is that we measured 
compliance intentions directly after delivering 
information security communication to the 
participants. In reality, a longer period may pass 
between security communication and the decision to 
violate a policy. Future research could include 
distractor tasks between the SETA communication 
and the scenario assessing their behavioral impacts, or 
could assess behavior days or weeks after the SETA 
communication. Previous research has demonstrated 
that brief experimental interventions in normative 
influence communication can have an effect for at 
least a month, though the effect does attenuate over 
time (Zitek & Hebl, 2007), and that information 
influence communication can last longer than 
normative influence communication (Kaplan & 
Miller, 1987). Therefore, it may be possible to use 
research designs that have longer time spans 
separating the SETA communication and the 
measurement of intentions.  
Further, the short messages were presented in the 
same order within the scenarios (1) because of 
limitations in the setup of the randomization of 
messages within the Qualtrics survey, and (2) because 
each message was placed within the scenario in a 
manner that made the wording of the scenario flow 
more effectively. Because the messages are short and 
appear close together, and because we included 
rigorous manipulation checks for each of the 
messages, we are confident that this would have little 
to no effect on the participants. However, there is 
always the possibility of a small effect.  
An additional limitation may be introduced by testing 
the theories only within one specific security policy 
violation behavior, namely password sharing (and 
with only two potential neutralization strategies). 
Though we hope that our antineutralization statement 
was general enough to apply to many different types 
of neutralization techniques, our study only 
specifically examined two. Future research should 
examine this technique against other neutralization 
types because neutralization types work differently 
depending on the situation (Silic et al., 2017). Several 
studies have demonstrated the consistency of research 
results across multiple security scenarios. Johnston et 
al. (2015) found the same results from studying user 
reactions to password theft, to USB memory card 
loss, and from data theft from not logging off or from 
locking workstations. Siponen, Vance, & Willison 
(2012) similarly demonstrated consistent results 
across four unique security scenarios, and Siponen 
and Vance (2010) revealed somewhat consistent 
results from the three situations—USB drive loss, 
workstation logout, and password compromises. 
Nevertheless, Sarker (2016) argues for a balance 
between theoretical abstractions that provide 
contextual specificity and generality. He concurs that 
we should contextualize the findings by identifying 
relevant boundary conditions, but he also respects the 
generalizability of good theory, albeit without 
subscribing to universalism. Accordingly, we 
recognize the potential limitation introduced by 
testing our theories within the boundary conditions of 
our contextual abstraction.  
Another limitation of using short communication 
messages is finding the right level of personalization. 
Some messages in our study may (or may not) have 
appeared to be more personalized, whereas others 
may have seemed to be more formal. Messages can 
also be framed to sound more threatening, friendlier, 
or have any other number of nuances associated with 
them. Previous research examined the effects of 
positive or negative framing of security messages on 




compliance behavior and found no effect (Barlow et 
al., 2013). However, one should take care in 
interpreting differences between the strength of 
information, normative, and antineutralization 
statements based on other aspects of these messages. 
Future research should more fully examine the effect 
of how personalizing a message (vs. giving a 
standard, company-wide message as suggested in this 
paper) would affect an employee’s compliance 
behavior. A more personalized message may make 
informational or normative statements more powerful.  
An additional limitation is the lack of explicit 
statements pertaining to sanction severity and 
certainty in the scenarios. Such statements would 
allow for better control of deterrence effects. 
Although the scenarios indicated that penalties will 
be enacted against those individuals who violate 
security policies, more specific statements could be 
incorporated and tested to further explore the 
nuanced differences between persuasive 
information security communication and the 
deterrence mechanisms in place. Therefore, future 
studies could incorporate high/low sanction severity and 
certainty statements into their scenarios (see 
Willison et al. (2018) for example scenarios with 
this property), though this would effectively 
quadruple the number of unique scenario versions.  
Another limitation is that we studied nonmalicious 
security policy violations that were performed by 
employees who were not seeking to inflict harm on 
their employer or to maximize their own personal 
gains. Previous distinctions (Guo et al., 2011; 
Willison & Warkentin, 2013) indicate that the 
motivations for such violations may be very different 
than for malicious violations. Future research should 
examine whether antineutralization communication 
has any effect on malicious violations. It is hard to 
know if antineutralization communication would 
influence an employee who is truly seeking to steal 
from his or her employer or fellow employees or to 
harm them in some way (Willison & Warkentin, 
2013).  
Finally, we used a cross-sectional design in which 
participants were randomly assigned to treatments. 
We have no measure of participants’ prestudy 
compliance intentions, or how these may have been 
changed by the treatments, which is normal in 
laboratory research; such differences are controlled 
by random assignment. Future research could 
measure the longitudinal effects of security 
communication.  
5.3 Implications for Future Research 
This study contributes to theory by examining 
whether short reinforcing SETA communications 
containing informational, normative, and 
antineutralization statements are effective in diminishing 
information security policy violations. This study 
answers the call for research on persuasive 
communication for security training (Siponen, 2000; 
Thomson & von Solms, 1998). We believe there are six 
implications for future research.  
First and foremost, our study shows the significant 
and meaningful effects of both neutralization 
techniques and the antineutralization statements 
designed to mitigate their effects. Prompting 
participants with neutralization statements increased 
their likelihood of violating the security policy by a 
similar amount as the antineutralization statements 
decreased them (as seen by the similar parameters in 
Table 2). The interaction term was not significant, 
which means that the effects of antineutralization are 
independent of deliberately provoking neutralization, 
likely because employees are already engaging 
neutralization without prompting (although prompting 
increases its impact). The implication is that we need 
more research on neutralization and antineutralization. 
Our research shows that a simple, one-sentence general 
antineutralization statement improves compliance 
behavior. Can the impacts of antineutralization be 
strengthened by increasing the length and persuasiveness 
of antineutralization statements? Can antineutralization 
be improved by targeting specific neutralization 
techniques or are general statements targeting all types 
of neutralization better? We need more research on 
antineutralization SETA communication.  
Second, we found mixed effects from a simple one-
sentence informational statement designed to explain 
the consequences of violating policies. Informational 
influence acts by providing individuals with a better 
understanding of the situation (the consequences of 
their actions in this case), which changed the balance 
of costs and benefits such that employees were more 
likely to comply with security policies. Would more 
information have a greater impact? For example, 
would explaining the reasons behind a security 
policy, not just the policy itself, have even stronger 
effects?   
Third, there was no interaction between informational 
and antineutralization statements, indicating that they act 
independently of each other. Thus, the theoretical 
mechanisms by which the two work must be different. 
Using medical terminology, we would say they have 
different “receptors” and thus can be used in conjunction 
with each other much like ibuprofen and acetaminophen. 
We need more research on how these two act and how to 
better increase their joint effectiveness.   
Fourth, we found that normative influence statements 
had no effect. Past research and theory led us to argue 
that SETA communications containing normative 
influence statements should have an effect, because it 
has shown internally generated normative beliefs 





influence compliance behavior (Bulgurcu et al. 2010). 
However, in scenarios such as those we presented, 
where rationalization would be easy, normative 
statements about what the majority of employees 
would do was not powerful enough to influence 
violation intentions. The effects may have been 
stronger if normative influence was delivered directly 
from a known colleague rather than being invoked in 
a short general form as we did in this study (i.e., as “a 
recent survey of our employees”). That is, the unique 
reinforcing aspect of the communication we tested is 
different from other types of SETA programs 
designed to reduce security violations. We need more 
research to better understand why internally generated 
normative beliefs appear to influence behavior (at 
least from post hoc reports) but externally generated 
short normative statements provided as reinforcement 
prior to a decision to violate do not. 
Fifth, we found some important similarities and 
differences between past research (which has sought 
to understand what factors influence security 
violation intentions) and our research (which strives 
to evaluate if SETA communications designed using 
that understanding can influence behavior). Past 
research concludes that violation decisions are 
influenced by information about the consequences of 
violating the policy and by normative beliefs about 
what others would do. We found that SETA 
communications that included informational 
statements about consequences of violations reduced 
the intention to violate, but that SETA 
communications incorporating normative statements 
about what others would do had no effect on 
violation intentions. This suggests that 
informational and normative beliefs operate in 
fundamentally different ways in influencing 
security violation intentions. This calls for more 
research on the differences between informational 
and normative influences on violation intentions, 
and why some factors shown to influence 
intentions (i.e., information) can be used to alter 
them whereas others (i.e., normative) cannot.  
Sixth, another interesting finding of this study is in 
Table 4: the nonsignificant neutralization treatment 
(denial of injury to others) did not provide any 
personal benefit; whereas the significant 
neutralization treatment (defense of necessity) did 
provide personal benefits. This provides interesting 
insights in that cognitive dissonance may be the 
strongest and people may feel more motivated to 
use neutralizations when they perceive some direct 
benefit from doing so. Therefore, future research 
could examine a baseline condition with two other 
conditions: (1) a neutralization condition that 
offers no personal benefits and (2) a neutralization 
condition that offers personal benefits.  
Finally, we believe that this research opens a new 
direction for security research. Past security research 
has focused on deterrence, which is appropriate given 
its traditional roots in criminology (D’Arcy et al., 
2009). Our research shows that incorporating 
cognitive concepts such as informational and 
normative communication into information security 
research, as advocated by Puhakainen and Siponen 
(2010), has an influence on policy violations. This 
provides a much broader view that offers rich insights 
into the ways we can influence—in positive and 
negative ways—information systems security 
compliance by directly influencing the decision-
making process of employees who face security- 
related decisions every day.   
5.4 Implications for Practice 
This study contributes to practice by examining 
specific types of persuasion that can be incorporated 
into organizational communication to address security 
vulnerabilities. First, we recommend that organizations 
include specific, strong informational statements that 
explain the purpose of information security policies 
when they engage in security communication. Second, 
we recommend that they directly communicate, in a 
variety of security training and communication 
methods, that the usage of neutralization techniques is 
unacceptable (i.e., antineutralization statements). Such 
antineutralization statements could also be personalized 
for different types of individual biases, much like 
SETA communication can be personalized to different 
individual traits (Johnston et al., 2016). Finally, we 
conclude that, even though norms can influence 
security behavior, including indirect normative 
information in short security communication is not as 
powerful. 
6 Conclusion 
This study was the first to develop and test distinct 
categories of persuasion techniques for information 
security SETA programs, including communications 
to employees, in common situations where employees 
may be tempted to rationalize insecure behavior. We 
found that informational statements and 
antineutralization statements are particularly helpful 
in decreasing employee intentions to violate 
information security policies in these situations. Our 
findings provide foundation for further research 
within the information security domain. The results 
also provide guidance to information security 
managers who design SETA programs to enhance 
compliance with information security policies.
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Appendix A. Scenarios 
Table A1. Baseline Scenario 
At Crossroads, Inc.*, management has been focusing on increasing compliance with IT security policies. The company has penalties in 
place for employees who violate policies. The company recently developed an IT security training program where employees read 
information about IT security policies and have a group discussion about them. Here is an excerpt from the security training program 
materials:  
       “As stated in our security policies, employees should not share computer passwords with other coworkers. This applies equally to all 
employees.   
       “[Insert normative influence statement here.]”  
       “[Insert antineutralization influence statement here.]”  
       “[Insert informational influence statement here.]”  
Matt* is one of the employees at Crossroads, Inc. who has completed the security training program. While out of town, Matt gets an 
urgent call from a coworker, John. John tells Matt that he has to get a project done right away to meet a deadline, but he needs some 
information from Matt. Matt recalls that the information John needs is saved on the hard drive of Matt’s office computer, which is not set 
up for remote access. John asks Matt to share his password in order to access the needed information for his report.   
[Insert neutralization technique here.] Matt decides to go ahead and share his password with John.  
Normative influence statement: A recent survey of our employees concerning this policy showed that over 85 percent would not 
share their password, even with another employee, regardless of the circumstances. 
(No normative influence statement)  
Antineutralization statement: Even though people believe that sharing passwords can be justified under certain circumstances without any 
real consequences, adherence to this policy is important; sharing of passwords should not be justified for any reason. 
(No antineutralization influence statement)  
Informational influence statement: While it may not appear to be the case, there are often real consequences of sharing passwords that 
extend beyond the person disobeying the policy, such as when a company recently experienced unauthorized access to confidential 
customer information because an employee shared his password.  
(No informational influence statement)  
Denial of injury: Matt knows that John is trustworthy and feels that no harm would result from sharing his password with John this 
one time. Besides, he can change his password afterwards.  
Defense of necessity: Matt knows that John’s project is critical to the success of their department. If the project fails, there will be 
consequences not only for John, but also for Matt. Matt is unable to get to the office today, so he feels there is no other choice.  
(No neutralization technique)  
Note: There are 2x2x2x3 (24) versions of this scenario.  
* Each scenario has unique company and individual names. We reviewed and changed names during multiple rounds of expert review. 
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Table A2. Example Scenario 
At Crossroads, Inc., management has been focusing on increasing compliance with IT security policies. The company has penalties in 
place for employees who violate policies. The company recently developed an IT security training program where employees read 
information about IT security policies and have a group discussion about them. Here is an excerpt from the security training program 
materials:  
        “As stated in our security policies, employees should not share computer passwords with other coworkers. This applies equally to all 
employees.   
        “A recent survey of our employees concerning this policy showed that over 85 percent would not share their password, even 
with another employee, regardless of the circumstances.”   
        “Even though people believe that sharing passwords can be justified under certain circumstances without any real consequences, 
adherence to this policy is important; sharing of passwords should not be justified for any reason.”  
        “While it may not appear to be the case, there are often real consequences of sharing passwords that extend beyond the person 
disobeying the policy, such as when a company recently experienced unauthorized access to confidential customer information because 
an employee shared his password.” 
Matt* is one of the employees at Crossroads, Inc. who has completed the security training program. While out of town, Matt gets an 
urgent call from a coworker, John. John tells Matt that he has to get a project done right away to meet a deadline, but he needs some 
information from Matt. Matt recalls that the information John needs is saved on the hard drive of Matt’s office computer, which is not set 
up for remote access. John asks Matt to share his password in order to access the needed information for his report.   
Matt knows that John is trustworthy and feels that no harm would result from sharing his password with John this one time. Besides, 
he can change his password afterwards. Matt decides to go ahead and share his password with John 
Note: Formatting in the example scenarios in Table A1 and A2 indicate the following: antineutralization, normative influence, 
informational influence, denial of injury.  




Appendix B. Survey Measures 
 Filter Questions  
Have you held a job in a workplace that had guidelines, work rules, or policies for employees? YES/NO  
Have you held a job in which you used a computer for your work? YES/NO  
[If participants answer “no” to either, the survey ends and Qualtrics does not collect further data]  
  
Manipulation Check  
Please select an answer for the following items as they relate to the scenario above:  
[Each question only present when the corresponding statement was included in the scenario.]  
  
In this scenario, the security awareness training material clearly states that:  
a. employees should never justify sharing passwords.  
b. employees will receive written warnings for sharing passwords.  
  
According to this scenario, the security awareness training material includes:  
a. a statement from the CEO about the importance of adhering to the policy.  
b. a summary of results of a recent employee survey concerning the policy.  
  
According to this scenario, the security awareness training material includes:  
a. a description of possible consequences—other than penalties to the employee—of sharing passwords.  
b. a summary of other IT security policies related to the password policy.  
  
How does Matt justify sharing his password in this scenario?  
a. He believes that no harm will result from sharing his password.  
b. He believes that sharing his password is critical to the success of his department.  
c. He believes that because he has been a good employee for many years he can share his password.  
  
[General question for the one “baseline” scenario that had no manipulation statements]  
In this scenario, the security awareness training material clearly states that: 
a. employees will receive written warnings for sharing passwords.  
b. the IT security policy in question applies equally to all employees.  
  
Content validity (realism check)                                                  SD D N A SA  
I could imagine a similar scenario taking place at my company.       1 2 3 4 5  
  
Dependent variable measures (behavioral intention)                 SD D N A SA  
In this situation, I would do the same as Matt.                                   1 2 3 4 5  
If I were Matt, I would have also shared my password.                     1 2 3 4 5  
I think I would do what Matt did.                                                       1 2 3 4 5  
I think others would do the same if they were Matt.                          1 2 3 4 5  
  
Demographic items  
I am                                                                    Male / Female  
My age is                                                          (freeform integer)  
Years of work experience:                               (freeform integer)  
Highest education:                                            Some high school / High school / Undergraduate / Graduate 
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Appendix C. Data Filtering and Robustness Checks 
Data Filtering 
Considering the difficulty in obtaining reliable data from online survey participants, we wanted to ensure that we 
received quality responses for our data analysis. Therefore, we contracted with Qualtrics to acquire survey responses 
from 200 participants who had passed all filter, response set, and manipulation check questions in our design. Each 
time a recruited participant answered one of these questions unsatisfactorily, the survey ended early for that 
participant, and the response was marked incomplete. This process continued until 200 completed surveys met these 
criteria.  
First, we filtered participants to include only those who worked full-time in companies with computer policies. Of 
the 908 initial participants, 262 did not pass these filter questions and saw no scenarios, resulting in 646 participants 
who completed at least one scenario. When participants failed the response set question, indicating they were not 
paying attention to the survey questions, the survey ended and these participants were not included in the final data 
set (Andrich, 1978; Kerlinger, 1973; Rennie, 1982). This included 102 participants, reducing our data set to 544 
participants who passed all filter or response set questions. Based on the correlation of failing manipulation checks 
with lack of motivation and disregard for research instructions, experimental researchers recommend that data 
including failed manipulation checks not be included in data analysis (Oppenheimer et al., 2009). Of the remaining 
544 participants, 303 did not correctly answer all manipulation check questions, leaving 241 participants with valid 
responses to at least one scenario. However, of these 241, 41 closed the survey early, not completing the 
demographic portion of the survey and in some cases only completing one of the two scenarios. 
Additional Data Analysis as Robustness Checks 
Our main data analysis considered the 200 fully complete and valid survey completions (400 total scenario 
responses) that we contracted for and received from Qualtrics. However, Qualtrics kindly provided the partial data 
from all participants who started the survey. Given that a large portion of the data were removed due to incomplete 
responses or failed manipulation checks, we repeated our analysis summarized in Table 2 of the main text on three 
additional data sets that included excluded participants.   
The first data set we used in our robustness checks (“A”) consisted of all valid survey responses where filter, 
response set, and manipulation check questions were correct (241 participants; 451 scenarios), even though some of 
these had missing demographic data because the survey was closed early. In the second data set (“B”), we only 
excluded the participants who did not pass the filter questions and the response set questions, keeping incomplete 
surveys where in some cases the manipulation check was answered incorrectly (544 participants; 831 scenarios). The 
third data set used for robustness analysis (“C”) consisted of all data where participants passed the initial filter 
questions, regardless of whether they answered response set and/or manipulation check questions correctly (646 
subjects, 954 scenarios). Given that only the 200 final participants completed demographic information, the 
demographic variables could not be examined as control variables in these three data sets.  
The results of analyzing these data sets were largely similar to the results of the main analysis. In particular, in all 
data sets, neutralization statements increased the likelihood that a participant would state intentions to violate the 
policy, antineutralization statements were consistently powerful in reducing stated intentions to violate, and there 
was an effect order. There were two differences in the results between these additional data sets and the main 
analysis. First, realism was significant in these data sets—those who viewed the scenarios as more realistic were 
more likely to state intentions to violate the policy. Second, information influence statements were only statistically 
significant in data set “B” (further reflecting a slight effect that is statistically significant in some data subsets, but 
not others). See Table C1 for summarized results.  
In these additional data sets, we also controlled for the effects of completing the survey, passing manipulation 
checks, and passing the response set questions. Of these, only the responses to the response set questions were 
significantly correlated with stating intentions to violate policy. Specifically, those who passed the response set 
questions, indicating they paid attention to the survey, were less likely to state intentions of violating a policy. This is 
intuitive, because those not paying attention would be more likely to select “agree” or “strongly agree” on most 








Table C1. Robustness Check Results 
 Data set “A” Data set “B” Data set “C” 
 Estimate p Estimate p Estimate p 
Intercept 1.816 <0.001 1.468 <0.001 1.338 <0.001 
Use of neutralization techniques 0.304** 0.005 0.333*** <0.001 0.305*** <0.001 
Informational influence statement -0.151 0.187 -0.182* 0.019 -0.102 0.147 
Normative influence statement 0.101 0.324 0.055 0.447 0.000 0.998 
Antineutralization influence statement 0.377*** <0.001 -0.294*** <0.001 -0.294*** <0.001 
Order -0.121* 0.039 -0.167** 0.005 -0.199*** <0.001 
Realism 0.088† 0.094 0.179*** <0.001 0.224*** <0.001 
Participant fully completed the survey -0.124 0.501 -0.017 0.897 -0.064 0.596 
Participant passed manipulation checks    0.155 0.146 -0.070 0.455 
Participant passed response set     -0.414*** <0.001 
Note : †p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p <0.01; *** p < 0.01 
 
Finally, we also performed a robustness check where we analyzed only the responses to the first scenario seen by 
each participant. These results are shown in Table C2. 
Table C2. Robustness Check for First Scenarios 
 Full results (n = 400) Only first scenario n = 200) 
 Estimate p Estimate P 
Intercept -0.443 0.216 -0.349 0.425 
Use of neutralization techniques 0.227* 0.026 0.193 0.228 
Informational influence statement -0.175† 0.092 -0.188 0.201 
Normative influence statement 0.065 0.216 0.018 0.902 
Antineutralization influence statement -0.320** 0.001 -0.429** 0.003 
Order -0.142* 0.010 n/a n/a 
Realism 0.058 0.267 0.040 0.526 
Gender (Female) 0.092 0.465 0.154 0.296 
Age 0.000 0.982 0.001 0.962 
Work experience -0.005 0.624 -0.006 0.587 
Education 0.097 0.558 0.073 0.698 
Note : †p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p <0.01; *** p < 0.01;                           n = 400 scenarios                           n = 200 scenario 
As shown in the table, there were some small differences when testing only the first scenarios. Specifically, the 
explicit use of neutralization techniques in the scenario was no longer statistically significantly related to intentions 
to violate the policy. Informational statements, which were significant at the p < 0.1 level in the main results, did not 
have a statistically significant effect when analyzing only the first scenarios. However, it should be noted that the 
coefficient is actually greater than in the main results, but cutting the sample size in half greatly increased the p 
value. That is, the effect size is similar, but the statistical significance is weak. 
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Appendix D. Raw Data for Intention Scores by Group 
Table D1. Intention Scores by Group 
 Present Not Present 
Antineutralization statement 2.420 2.790 
Information influence statement 2.487 2.692 
Normative influence statement 2.608 2.593 
Denial of injury neutralization statement 2.486 
2.448 
Defense of necessity neutralization statement 2.849 
 
Appendix E. Interaction Effects 
We analyzed all interaction effects between neutralization types and the hypothesized effects of informational, 
normative, and antineutralization statements and found no significant results (see Table D1). In other words, the 
effects of the different types of persuasion were similar regardless of the specific neutralization type used in the 
various scenarios. 
Table E1. Interaction Effect Tests 
 Both neutralization types Denial of injury Defense of necessity 
 Estimate p Estimate p Estimate p 
Intercept -0.464 0.210 -0.565 0.147 -0.834 0.080 
Use of neutralization techniques 0.292 0.158 0.039 0.878 0.480* 0.028 
Informational influence statement -0.189 0.275 -0.174 0.324 -0.164 0.340 
Normative influence statement 0.091 0.607 0.086 0.629 0.080 0.652 
Antineutralization influence statement -0.258† 0.088 -0.252† 0.093 -0.255 0.105 
Order -0.140* 0.11 0.080 0.344 -0.071 0.765 
Realism 0.058 0.267 0.110† 0.060 0.091 0.136 
Gender (female) 0.092 0.471 0.178 0.212 0.008 0.957 
Age  0.000 0.974 -0.002 0.862 0.009 0.460 
Work experience -0.005 0.617 -0.004 0.723 -0.009 0.413 
Education 0.094 0.567 0.162 0.361 0.055 0.765 
Note : †p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p <0.01; *** p < 0.01 
 
Appendix F. SPSS Syntax 
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